Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the Nation-State: Revisiting Group Claims through a Complex Nexus in International Law by Pentassuglia, G
1 
 
Self-Determination, Human Rights, and the Nation-State: Revisiting Group 
Claims through a Complex Nexus in International Law  
 
Gaetano Pentassuglia 
Reader (professor) in International Law and Human Rights, University of Liverpool 
g.pentassuglia@liverpool.ac.uk 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article I examine selective international legal dimensions of the triangular nexus among the 
right to self-determination, human rights, and the ‘nation-state’ as they specifically affect the scope of 
claims made by certain ethno-cultural minority groups. I first discuss some conceptual extensions of 
‘national’ claims and their underlying relation to international law and state sovereignty. Then, I seek 
to expose dimensions of ‘national’ self-determination that are supposedly constitutive of the law of 
self-determination, including arguments about sub-national groups as ‘peoples’, and discuss some 
alternative approaches to the role of international law vis-à-vis this sort of group claims. Following on 
from this, and with a focus on the internal configuration of states, I argue that international human 
rights law can offer a synthesis of the self-determination/human rights/nation-state nexus to the extent 
that it is seen, not so much as a platform for accepting or rejecting seemingly ‘absolute’ rights or 
solely enabling legal-institutional ad hocism, but rather as a general process-based framework for 
assessing group-related pathologies that are (directly or indirectly) of international law’s own making.    
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1 Introduction: Charting the Field  
 
This article seeks to address the impact of claims made by certain ethno-cultural minority groups on 
the triangular nexus among the right to self-determination, the wider human rights framework, and the 
‘nation-state’, within the international legal system.1 In particular, it seeks to explore the way in which 
international human rights law deals with those claims within the framework of the state, and the 
polyphonic, and arguably ambivalent, discourses that result from that. While recent history’s ethno-
separatist claims tap into international law’s traditional inclinations to take external dimensions more 
seriously than internal ones, recent waves of ‘nationalist’ (exclusionary) arguments as a basis for the 
exercise of sovereign power,2 coupled with a surge in collective dimensions within human rights law 
and policy (indigenous rights being the most evident manifestation of this),3 make such an enquiry all 
the more fitting.   
 Indeed, ethno-cultural group claims, particularly those of a ‘national’ variety, sit at complex 
crossings of those three categories. They can as much ground as limit or reject those claims. In terms 
of postcolonial ramifications of self-determination, the intersection can operate at least at three levels. 
It can take the form of a discrete debate over whether a minority group can be entitled to separate 
statehood in the event that the group is chronically denied meaningful access to government by the 
                                                          
1 The focus will be on traditional sub-state minority groups loosely understood as those communities that claim to embody a 
strong sense of group identity, including national minorities, minority nations, or indigenous peoples or nations. The terms 
‘nation-state’ and ‘state’ will generally be used interchangeably, though ‘nation-state’ will emphasise, in a non-technical 
sense, a greater sense of national (state-wide) identity.   
2 Recent politically significant circumstances, such as the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s mounting regional and global 
ambitions, Great Britain’s Brexit decision, or the rise of anti-immigrant movements in Europe and the United States, have 
partly involved ideas of national identity.  
3 See e.g. G. Pentassuglia, “Ethnocultural Diversity and Human Rights: Legal Categories, Claims, and the Hybridity of 
Group Protection”, VI The Yearbook of Polar Law (2015), p. 250. 
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state where it is located.4 It can translate into claims of distinctive groups as ‘peoples’ for purposes of 
internal self-determination, or even external self-determination insofar as the claim relates to the issue 
of secession or is otherwise linked to ‘peoplehood’ tout court, regardless of its multiple articulations.5 
Or it can more narrowly reflect a self-determination process involving the entire population of the 
state, including minority groups, but with no international legal criteria as to how to handle group 
claims to specific articulations of internal self-determination.6  
 The (re-)formulation of self-determination as a human right both within and outside the colonial 
context further complicates matters. The impact of the human rights argument on ethno-cultural 
claims has largely become a function of the general democratic entitlement which is claimed to exist 
in matters of internal governance, and, more specifically, of the connection between (internal) self-
determination and group accommodation, including possibilities for autonomy arrangements. Just as 
the meaning of democratic participation in the political community is the subject of some contention, 
so are the legal ramifications of that connection.7  
 Group claims of this sort are equally affected, though more broadly, by the legal and political 
narrative of the nation-state. For one thing, the ‘neutrality’ of the state’s public culture has been 
challenged on the basis that minority cultures are endemically under greater threat than majority 
cultures in the public sphere and thus require special protection. In this sense, the state’s ostensibly 
equal treatment of individuals within the political community is said either to conceal majoritarian 
preferences and identities in the public distribution of resources and structures or otherwise to reflect a 
vision of a uniform polity that is at odds with the recognition of group diversity within.8 At the same 
time, the pre- and first post-war encounter between statehood and the notion of ‘national’ self-
determination (based on a virtual congruence of the political and cultural – indeed, ‘national’ – 
boundaries of the state), though relatively short-lived in the wider framework of international law and 
relations, generated a variety of responses to sub-national claims the doctrinal and institutional 
richness and seminal character of which have been thoroughly documented and examined.9  
 These lines of reasoning or areas of legal uncertainties all speak to certain understandings of self-
determination, human rights, or the state in international law and their difficult encounters with 
underlying group claims and identities. It is no coincidence that complex cases of group 
accommodation tend to be explained as an illustration of an ‘enhanced’ role of international law and 
institutions in problem-solving, or even as attempts at creatively transcending the external and internal 
strictures of sovereignty as an international and constitutional legal category.10  
 However, at the level of general international law discourse, these conundrums have been more 
typically subsumed into discussions of ‘absolute’ rights, understood in the weak sense of direct, 
generally applicable and/or unilateral rights that inhere in particular types of entities – either groups 
defined by ethno-cultural elements or wider ‘civic’ entities or polities that are deemed entitled to 
representation and self-government. Whether it is secession, forms of autonomy, or democratic 
governance, international law scholars, human rights experts and/or civil society organisations have 
variably contributed to a discourse which is essentially concerned with the existence (vel non) of a 
distinctive legal right that can benefit the entity in question. 
 Less of a concern, though, has been the development of a deeper understanding of what is at 
stake when it comes to addressing group claims or some of them, or otherwise the outlining of a 
                                                          
4 See e.g. T. Frank, “Post-modern tribalism and the right to secession”, in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and  M. Zieck (eds.), 
Peoples and Minorities in International Law (Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht, 1993), p. 3, at pp. 13-14.  
5 See e.g. J. Crawford, “The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Development and Future”, in P. Alston, 
Peoples’ Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001), p. 6, at pp. 64-65; D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-
Determination (Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht, 2002), ch. 7; H. Moodrick-Even Khen, National Identities and the 
Right to Self-Determination of Peoples (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2016).  
6 A. Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), p. 332. 
7 See below, Section 4.   
8 See e.g. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989); A. Patten, Equal 
Recognition: The Moral Foundations of Minority Rights (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014); J. Tully, Strange 
Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995).  
9 N. Berman, ““But the Alternative is Despair”: European Nationalism and the Modernist Renewal of International Law”, 
106 Harvard Law Review (1993), p. 1792.    
10 N. Berman, supra note 9; D. Orentlicher, “Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-Separatist Claims”, 23 
Yale Journal of International Law (1998), p. 1, at pp. 62-68; C. Bell, On the Law of Peace: Peace Agreements and the Lex 
Pacificatoria (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008), chs. 5,11. 
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framework for assessing the relative legitimacy of such claims. Drawing mainly upon recent crises 
involving a plurality of claims and/or violent strife (Quebec/Canada, USSR/Yugoslavia, and so on), 
commentators have frequently called for a mechanism or process that has the capacity to handle these 
issues, and to do so in ways that are timely and responsive to local or regional circumstances. This 
approach significantly differs from positions that are overly reliant on ‘inherent’ rights to self-
determination (or autonomy), or all-encompassing rights to democratic governance based on 
elections, in that it involves an active and sustained engagement with multiple claims, including group 
claims, and wider societal conditions, in an attempt to regulate conflicts, both domestically and within 
the international legal system.11  
 There is evidence that some kind of process-based approach to the triangular relationship among 
self-determination, human rights, and sovereignty may be emerging in connection with processes of 
state creation,12 but there is little evidence of a parallel focus on how best to address group claims 
within the state from that perspective, and more crucially, why one ought to do so. Indeed, an 
important question is whether there is a way to explain the role of international human rights law in 
dealing with group claims that lie at the intersection of the aforementioned triangular nexus without 
falling prey to aspirations based on primordial title or pristine national authenticity, the logic of fait 
accompli, or otherwise minimalist views of the democratic entitlement and its human rights 
components. 
 In this article I thus address selective dimensions of the self-determination/human rights/nation-
state entanglement as they specifically affect the scope of claims made by distinctive sub-state groups. 
I first discuss some conceptual extensions of ‘national’ claims and their underlying relation to 
international law and state sovereignty (Section 2). Then, I seek to expose dimensions of ‘national’ 
self-determination that are supposedly constitutive of the law of self-determination, including 
arguments about sub-national groups as ‘peoples’, and discuss some alternative approaches to the role 
of international law vis-à-vis this sort of group claims (Sections 3 and 4). Following on from this, and 
with a focus on the internal configuration of states, I argue that international human rights law can 
offer a synthesis of the self-determination/human rights/nation-state nexus to the extent that it is seen, 
not so much as a platform for accepting or rejecting seemingly ‘absolute’ rights or solely enabling 
legal-institutional ad hocism, but rather as a general process-based framework for assessing group-
related pathologies that are (directly or indirectly) of international law’s own making (Sections 5 and 
6).    
 
2  ‘National’ Claims, International Law, and the Shaping of Sovereignty 
  
In 2006, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly adopted a resolution on the concept of 
‘nation’ in response to debates over the legal and policy parameters of kin-state involvement in the 
affairs of kin-minority groups across state boundaries.13 While noting the impossibility of arriving at a 
common definition of the concept within the Council of Europe membership, the resolution provides 
something of a snapshot of familiar meanings derived from history, public discourse and expert 
analysis. It analytically distinguishes ‘nation’ as a legal-political category employed to describe a 
civic link between the state and the individuals subject to its jurisdiction from ‘nation’ as shorthand 
for a community which is organically defined by ethno-linguistic, indeed ethno-cultural, traits broadly 
understood. Still, it crucially acknowledges the subtle intertwining of the two understandings to a 
point where both of them “are used simultaneously” or otherwise “the term “nation” is sometimes 
used with a double meaning, and at other times two different words are used to express each of those 
meanings” (para. 5). 
 When looking at the historical record, one may argue that such a subtle entanglement reflects 
complexities surrounding the relationship between political and cultural dimensions in the history of 
nationalism. For example, a rigid dichotomy between eighteenth and nineteenth century French and 
                                                          
11 From different angles, see e.g. M. Koskenniemi, “National Self-Determination Today: Problems of Legal Theory and 
Practice”, 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1994), p. 241, at pp. 264-269; R. Falk, Human Rights 
Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing World, ch. 6; D. Orentlicher, supra note 10. 
12 See below, Section 5. 
13 Recommendation 1735 (2006), The concept of “nation”, adopted by the Assembly on 26 January 2006 (7th Sitting). 
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Anglo-American ‘political’ nationalism and German, Italian or Polish ‘cultural’ nationalism, seems to 
obscure a more complex picture whereby hybrid political-cultural lines of thought or models of 
authority, or very real patterns of cultural-political dominance, can be found on both sides of that 
seemingly static division.14 Hurst Hannum15 usefully draws a distinction between ‘national’ demands 
by ethno-cultural groups or communities and ‘statism’ in the sense of claims to political power or the 
exercise of political authority on a purely institutional-territorial basis. And yet, he acknowledges the 
quest for homogeneity and uniformity by the new states that arose out of the anti-colonial movement 
post-1945, though ostensibly as a culturally neutral nation-building project. The fluid, even 
ambiguous, link between civic and ethnic dimensions of ‘nationhood’ has been amply documented 
and I will not pursue this line of reasoning any further.  
 Rather, what is important for the purpose of this discussion is to note that the concept of ‘nation’ 
has been used in history as much to assert national identity as to deny and supress ‘national’ diversity.  
Unsurprisingly, in the 2006 resolution the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly accounts for 
a trend towards a multicultural state that is capable of transcending purely ethnic or civic patterns of 
sovereign authority, one “where specific rights are recognised with regard not only to physical 
persons but also to cultural or national communities” (para. 7). Whereas classic versions of liberal, 
nationalist, and/or communitarian constitutionalism are all linked to visions of uniform polities bound 
together by common goods and (in the classic liberal variant) individualist pursuits,16 a multicultural 
approach to the state also requires a sustained commitment to intra-state group diversity within a 
commonly shared system of institutions and laws.17 It is thus the relationship between a dominant 
group and minority groups in the context of changes in sovereignty that takes centre stage. The 
resolution presents national minorities or communities as a “co-founding entity” of the nation-state, a 
by-product of reallocations of sovereign power across the international system in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries (and arguably in earlier centuries as well). It calls for collective protection through 
individual rights, including the right “of all individuals to belong to the nation which they feel they 
belong to”, either in terms of citizenship or “language, culture and traditions” (para. 12), as well as 
non-territorially-based structures endowed with legal personality (para. 10). 
 If this approach is a reasonably accurate one, both historically and conceptually, then, whatever 
we make of the resolution as a matter of law, it makes sense to explain ‘national’ claims by 
appreciating the analytical difference between the narrow question of whether a ‘nation’ needs to be 
established in order to substantiate a claim to statehood in international law from the broader question 
involving the articulation of group identities within an existing (or newly created) state. The early 
history of state-making and its reflection in the international legal order hardly reveals an automatic 
correlation, let alone a legal causality, between the prior existence of a coherent sense of ‘nationhood’ 
and the subsequent emergence of a sovereign state. As has been convincingly demonstrated, the rise 
of modern states, particularly in Western Europe, has often been a function of military, political 
and/or economic realities, including the requirements of industrialisation, rather than any deliberate 
effort to accommodate discrete (pre-defined) nations as natural units for new sovereign orders.18 This 
seems to be reinforced by the commonly held view that, in the eyes of international law, the state 
operates essentially as a regulatory or procedural mechanism that is capable of articulating external 
and internal sovereign power (whatever its precise territorial boundaries), not as an entity that affirms 
                                                          
14 See e.g. A. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1986), p. 139; F. Chabod, L’idea di 
nazione (Laterza, Roma, 1961), pp. 55-90 (tracing, for example, the difference between eighteenth and nineteenth century 
German and Italian ideas of the ‘nation’ back to an underlying critical distinction between Romantic pre- and a-political 
(pre-statal) naturalistic ethnos and political (state-oriented) voluntarism and humanitarianism). 
15 H. Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, rev. edition, Philadelphia, 1996), p. 24. 
16 J. Tully, supra note 8. 
17 See e.g. A. Eide, Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving 
minorities, UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 11 August 1993, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34 
(1993). 
18 A. Cobban, The Nation State and National Self-Determination (Thomas Y. Crowell, New York, rev. ed., 1969); E. 
Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2nd ed., 2009). 
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specific forms of communal identification (on whatever basis) upon which its existence or recognition 
is made legally dependent.19 
 Yet, it would be wrong to assume that ‘national’ identities and claims have proved of no 
consequence whatever to international law-making, and more to the point, the configuration and 
reconfiguration of states. Indeed, it might be argued that, although a temporal sequence or connection 
between ‘nationhood’ and statehood is virtually non-existent as an international legal condition 
relating to state-making, group identities in their multiple permutations have consistently impacted the 
concept of sovereignty in international law.20 As implied by the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary 
Assembly, the impact of group identities transcends the question of statehood per se to include the 
broader articulation of majority-minority dynamics generated by rearrangements of sovereign 
authority at various (recent and less recent) historical junctures. In this sense, the question of whether 
or not some ‘national’ aspirations have been occasionally accommodated into independent states – a 
question that reached its peak with the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference’s official (altogether 
remarkable) commitment to a nation-to-state trajectory – is comparatively less significant than a 
proper understanding of the underlying plurality of ‘national’ demands occasioned by those 
rearrangements and the plurality of ways in which international law has sought to respond to those 
recalibrations as ultimately matters of inter-group diversity.      
 Whatever our preferred reading or understanding of a ‘nation’, the reality of states as legal 
entities is almost invariably the reality of a ‘public culture’ coalescing around a dominant group. As 
states look largely ‘faceless’ from an international law standpoint, the recognition and accommodation 
of group diversity – paradoxically – regularly features as a crucial legal dimension of the state-
building process. A few examples can help briefly illustrate the point. The Westphalia settlement in 
1648, overwhelming credited with inaugurating the state system in Europe as an alternative to several 
medieval models of political organisation, constructed sovereignty in conjunction with the protection 
of Catholic and Protestant minorities within states in which the dominant religion was, respectively, 
Protestant or Catholic. Under the Treaty of Osnabrück, the principle of cuius regio, eius religio, which 
had allowed princes to define the faith of their territories as a key hallmark of their sovereign 
authority, came to be restricted to their court and could not in any way affect minority religious 
practices as long as the latter did not threaten public order. The very fabric of sovereignty thus 
involved an obligation to recognise religious pluralism while still reserving the right to emigrate (ius 
emigrandi) to those who did not accept the new state of affairs.21 If the Peace of Westphalia 
understood the majority-minority identities underpinning state-building through the lens of religion, 
the Versailles settlement in the aftermath of the First World War did so by openly using the language 
of ‘nationhood’. However, the international law of the time did not prioritise the ‘nation’ over the 
‘state’, but rather gave rise to a complex system whereby various sources of authority coexisted in 
international legal doctrine and practice in articulating responses to ‘national’ demands.22 The 
plurality of ‘national’ claims was effectively more significant than ‘national’ sovereignty as such. 
Indeed, US President Wilson’s commitment to the recognition of new states in “indisputably” national 
territories23 proved only part of a wider treaty-based and institutional structure designed to empower 
international law over and above other sources of authority, whether state or nation, in addressing 
inter-group diversity issues from within the system.  For instance, in the Aaland Islands case,24 the 
Commission of Jurists appointed by the League of Nations’ Council to determine the (international or 
domestic) nature of the dispute between Finland and Sweden went as far as to recognise something of 
a ‘national’ droit acquis in favour of the Aalanders (equal or akin to the right of the Finnish ‘nation’ 
                                                          
19 For discussion, see e.g. M. Craven, “Statehood, Self-determination, and Recognition”, in M. Evans (ed.), International 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010), p. 203. 
20 For a useful survey of legal history, see J. Nijman, “Minorities and Majorities”, in B. Fassbinder and A. Peters (eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), p. 100. 
21 For an insightful analysis, see C. Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2013), pp. 97-102. 
22 N. Berman, supra note 9. 
23 US President Wilson’s Fourteen Points Address to Congress, 8 January, 1918, point XIII (regarding Poland); see also 
similar references, including point IX (regarding Italy) and point XI (regarding several Balkan states). 
24 The Aaland Islands Question (On Jurisdiction), Report of the International Committee of Jurists, League of Nations 
Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 3 (1920); The Aaland Islands Question (On the Merits), Report by the Commission 
of Rapporteurs, League of Nations Council Document B7 21/68/106 (1921). 
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to seek independence from the Russian Empire) at a time when, in the Commission’s view, the 
‘normal’ rules of positive international law, including traditional prerogatives of sovereignty, did not 
apply because of deep political uncertainty. Yet, both this Commission and the Rapporteurs who were 
subsequently called upon to decide on the merits of the case, declined to use the ‘nation’ as the 
ultimate controlling legal principle in state-making. Instead, they framed (in different ways) the 
flexible role of international law (and the international community) in responding to group demands 
deemed legitimate under the circumstances.  
 Remarkably similarly, the so-called Badinter Commission established by the-then European 
Community (EC) to assess the situation in the former Yugoslavia, indicated in its well-known 
Opinion No. 2 that the Serbs within emerging Bosnia had a “right to choose their nationality”, 
controversially implying a complex reshaping of internal and external sovereignty as part of a wider 
package of guarantees under international law, though stopping short of making Serbian nationality 
the foundation of separate statehood.25 In a broadly similar vein, recent comprehensive group 
accommodation settlements such as the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia, the 1998 Good 
Friday Agreement on Northern Ireland, and several other peace settlements seeking to accommodate 
and govern competing claims, translate ‘national’ demands (“the right of all individuals to belong to 
the nation which they feel they belong to”, in the words of the 2006 Council of Europe resolution) 
into elements for creative exercises in constitutional restructuring within and across state boundaries, 
based on an expanded cumulative view of international law and human rights standards, including 
enhanced modalities of group protection.26    
 In short, the 2006 Council of Europe resolution exemplifies an attempt to capture the interplay 
between sovereignty and group diversity in a way that is arguably consistent with recent and less 
recent practice. Although international law does not feature ‘nationhood’ as a pre-condition for 
statehood (let alone a definition of ‘nation’), it has typically sought to accommodate, and yet 
discipline, ‘national’ demands as an area of inter-group diversity relating to the content and shape of 
sovereignty – from relatively straightforward respect for cultural diversity to complex forms of 
dislocation of power.  It goes without saying that, while not all such demands seek, or even require, 
significant degrees of political power or decision-making authority, many claimants have used the 
language of ‘national’ self-determination to articulate those demands. It is to this dimension that I 
now turn. 
 
3  ‘National’ Self-Determination in International Law: A Critique of Familiar 
  Themes  
  
In this context, self-determination claims made by groups who view themselves as ‘nations’ or 
‘peoples’ – be they the ethnic Russians in Ukraine, the Kosovar Albanians, or the Kurds in Turkey 
and elsewhere – are significant in at least two respects. For one thing, they seek to expand on the 
‘international law of nationalism’27 by closing the aforementioned gap between ‘nationhood’ and 
sovereignty in legal and political discourse. They wish to push the general boundaries of international 
law through the specific law of self-determination. At the same time, as the law of self-determination 
resists using the ‘nation’ as its ultimate most authentic source of legal rights, the question arises as to 
how best to deal with those claims within the international legal order.  In the current section and 
following one, I will briefly critique, respectively, some familiar themes surrounding the ‘national’ 
self-determination claim and a few alternative lines of thinking that have been suggested. There exist 
at least four such themes, what I might call ‘myths’ about self-determination: that there is a linear 
continuity in thinking about self-determination as an international legal entitlement; that self-
determination is fundamentally about independence or secession; that it operates as an inherent 
                                                          
25 European Community Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 11 January 1992, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), 
p. 1497 
26 C. Bell, supra note 10. 
27 I borrow this expression from Nathaniel Berman’s chapter titled “The International Law of Nationalism: Group Identity 
and Legal History”, in D. Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 
1998), p. 25. 
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unilateral right; and that it is defined by the universal aspiration of groups who characterise 
themselves as ‘peoples’ or ‘nations’ in a broadly cultural sense. 
 
3.1  Legal Continuity or Switch?  
It has not been uncommon for commentators to assume (explicitly or implicitly) that the international 
legal right to self-determination as it developed in the second post-war period somehow built upon the 
‘national’ categories employed to reshape Europe after the First World War.28 The underlying idea is 
that, whatever permutations the concept of self-determination may have undergone in the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s, the operationalisation of self-determination came to be essentially a way of 
prioritising certain ‘peoples’ or ‘nations’ over others in the process of state-making and never quite 
managed to overcome a nationalist view of self-determination linked to some kind of ethno-cultural 
status.29  
 In a stronger legal sense, the argument suggests that the way in which the UN-sponsored process 
of decolonisation was organised – by establishing a “territory which is geographically separate and is 
distinct ethnically and/or culturally” in UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV) as a material 
basis for identifying the colonial units which qualified for self-determination under the terms of the 
1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples – signalled the 
endorsement of ‘national’ self-determination in its multiple variants. It represented, in other words, 
some kind of iteration of the concept that was deemed acceptable (at least politically) at Versailles. 
While this argument is used, rather curiously, to both support and challenge an ethno-nationalist view 
of self-determination (particularly through the overwhelmingly chosen pattern of liberation:  
independence),30 it does not stand the test of a rigorous scrutiny of state practice.  
 The Versailles settlement in 1919 sought to accommodate, however imperfectly and in quite a 
hybridised manner, some of the ‘nationalities’ of Europe. It did not reach out to overseas European 
colonies, despite Lenin’s earlier suggestion that ‘national’ self-determination should have that broader 
anti-imperial thrust and US President Wilson’s seemingly unintentional open characterisation of the 
colonial issues facing the international community at that stage in Point V of his Fourteen Points 
Address to Congress in 1918.31 Besides its geographically circumscribed and substantively qualified 
scope (in terms of limited statehood, minority protection, and/or plebiscites), the settlement, though 
impactful at the level of international legal doctrine and practice, did not translate into a freestanding 
legal right to self-determination, as was made clear by the Commission of Jurists in the Aaland 
Islands case. From this perspective, the United Nations Charter adopted in 1945 could not have been 
any more aloof from the Versailles line of thinking. The ‘nations’ of Article 1 (2) of the Charter on 
which “equal rights and self-determination of peoples” were to be based were essentially already 
constituted states pledging respect and friendly relations to one another.32 There was no legal right to 
self-determination per se, let alone a legal right for stateless ‘nations’. The right to self-determination 
in the context of decolonisation had not been enshrined in 1945 but rather developed by way of 
practice at a later stage. Contrary to some popular perceptions, the Charter did accommodate the 
expectations of the remaining colonial empires, though in attenuated form, through the non-self-
governing and trust territories systems (Chapters XI and XII). If it ever meant anything specific, the 
ethno-cultural reference in Resolution 1541 (XV) applied to the relationship between the coloniser 
and the colonised rather than the ethno-cultural features of any particular community – the myriad of 
them encompassed by the administrative boundaries of the crumbling empires. It contributed at best to 
                                                          
28 For discussion, see C. Reus-Smit, supra note 21, pp. 187-192. 
29 From different perspectives, see e.g. F. Tesón, “Introduction: The Conundrum of Self-Determination”, in F. Tesón (ed.), 
The Theory of Self-Determination (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016), p. 1; F. Mégret, “The Right to Self-
Determination: Earned, Not Inherent”, Ibid., p. 45.  
30 See e.g. A. Patten, “Self-Determination for National Minorities”, in F. Tesón (ed.), supra note 29, pp. 126-129; E. 
Rodríguez-Santiago, The Evolution of Self-Determination of Peoples in International Law, Ibid., p. 238. 
31 “A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the 
principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal 
weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined”; for commentary, see A. Cobban, supra 
note 18, p. 21. For earlier articulations of the concept within Marxist socialist thought and the famously tense debate 
between Lenin and Luxemburg over self-determination, see H. Davis (ed.), The National Question: Selected Writings by 
Rosa Luxemburg (Monthly Review Press, New York and London, 1976).  
32 A. Cassese, supra note 6, pp. 37-43. 
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marking off a space separate from the metropolitan state where sovereign power exercised by a distant 
ruler was no longer legitimate. The decolonisation that became acceptable as an international law 
standard was unsurprisingly built around geography, not demography, territory, not nationhood or 
ethno-cultural identity, external, not internal, matters. In fact, the national liberation movements that 
eventually achieved independence on behalf of the colonies were amongst the most ardent supporters 
of this line, pre- and post-independence.33  
 That said, two caveats seem to be in order. One is that, no matter how starkly different, Versailles 
self-determination and UN (colonial) self-determination both generated significant ruptures and 
realignments within the state system. In other words, both of them, in their own distinct ways, worked 
towards strengthening the state as the fundamental unit of the international legal order. Both of them 
reaffirmed state sovereignty as the key institutional pillar of international law, though the expansive 
move of decolonisation grossly outweighed the more limited Wilsonian approach to state-making. It 
is this systemic institutional point that can lead to a cumulative view of these historical developments, 
not any underlying linear thinking about nationality or ethno-cultural diversity per se. The other is 
that, the differences between the two stages of self-determination discourse did not mean – and could 
not have meant – the vanishing of ‘national’ claims, or more broadly, of inter-group diversity matters 
from the international legal and political landscape. It would be deceptively simple to argue that this is 
so merely because the law of colonial self-determination reconstructed the concept by disregarding 
those claims. Not only did pressing political crises – from Palestine to Cyprus – immediately call 
upon the United Nations to resort (partly at least) to the Versailles repertoire of legal techniques and 
heightened institutional competence vis-à-vis group accommodation, but also that panoply of tools 
was bound to resurface – wholly or partially – in connection with more recent crises in the Balkans 
and elsewhere.34   
  
3.2  A Quest for ‘Nation-Statehood’? 
As noted by Hurst Hannum, “[it] may well turn out that Europe’s most enduring legacy to Africa [as 
well as to Asia and the rest of the world] is the nation-state”.35 This point broadly echoes our previous 
acknowledgement of an overarching commitment to a state-centred international system running 
through the entire twentieth century, but also implies a constant (conscious or unconscious) attempt to 
carve out fairly uniform societies (politically and culturally) out of nation-building projects.  
 It is not unreasonable to argue that the “state-shattering practices”36 witnessed in non-colonial or 
postcolonial contexts like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and several other areas of the world, have 
sought to replicate the logic of the nation-state whereby appeals to democratic rule and ethno-cultural 
homogeneity have variably (and ambiguously) combined. Yet, however inconsistently and 
incompletely applied, the law of self-determination has carried with it much more than a mere 
insistence on independent statehood, and any quest for a homogenous nation-state is more likely to 
obscure than to clarify the issues involved.   
 For one thing, colonial self-determination never meant a simple transition to statehood for 
designated territories – independence for its own sake. Rather, it articulated a bundle of choices 
(independence being one of those) largely built around collective acts of decision-making, or, in the 
famous words of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Western Sahara, “the need to pay regard to 
the freely expressed will of peoples”.37 If this is correct, and however imperfectly implemented, 
external self-determination thus required (or at least assumed) minimal acts of popular sovereignty, 
namely a minimal substantive correlation between the colonial unit and its inhabitants, whatever the 
former’s ultimate shape.38 It is not entirely surprising that the UN Friendly Relations Declaration of 
                                                          
33 M. Koskenniemi, supra note 11, pp. 254-255 (“[w]hat was important for the liberators was to seize the particular forms of 
State power … that had been introduced by colonial rule, not to re-establish whatever tribal or statal entities preceded 
colonialism”).   
34 See e.g. N. Berman, supra notes 9 and 27; D. Orentlicher, supra note 10.  
35 H. Hannum, supra note 15, p. 25 (citing from A. A. Mazrui and M. Tidy, Nationalism and New States in Africa 
(Heinemann, London, 1984, p. 70). 
36 R. Falk, supra note 11, pp. 100-101. 
37 Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975, p. 12, at p. 25. See also UN General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), UN Doc. 
A/4684 (1960), Principle VI; see also the Declaration of Judge Nagendra Singh, Ibid., p. 81. 
38 For some grey areas in this regard, see K. Knop, Diversity and Self-Determination in International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2002), pp. 162-167.  
9 
 
1970 expanded on that seminal approach by not only matching classic colonialism with comparable 
situations of ‘alien subjugation and domination’ but also fostering a flexible concept of representative 
government that was, already at that stage, open to wider application beyond decolonisation matters, 
as evidenced by the case of apartheid South Africa.39 In fact, the 1970 Declaration inaugurated a 
progressive move towards the internal configuration of states, self-determination not simply as the 
legal trigger of external sovereign power in pre-defined scenarios but, more subtly, as the legal 
barometer of sovereignty within the state’s own political community.40 
 Indeed, the reformulation of self-determination as a human right and its entrenchment in 
common Article 1 of the UN Covenants on Human Rights, coupled with a string of developments in 
distinct areas of group protection (minority and indigenous rights featuring prominently among them), 
have gradually added to postcolonial extensions of the concept by viewing specific forms of 
‘effective’ participation in, or control over, decision-making processes as the most significant ways of 
enriching the minimum legal standard of ‘representative government’ within the wider polity which 
was upheld by the UN 1970 Declaration.41 Under international human rights law, general and special 
participation rights have in effect aimed to deliver rights to have a say, to shape up the process, or 
even to negotiate distinctive outcomes. While secessionist movements have been constantly resisted 
by the international community (at least as a matter of law), complex forms of representation 
routinely feature in contemporary accounts of self-determination – from relatively basic demands for 
group equality and recognition within mainstream institutions to hybrid attempts to accommodate 
individual and collective interests across internal and external dimensions of sovereignty.42   
 This brings the other legal pillar of self-determination into focus: the principle of territorial 
integrity as articulated by both the 1960 and 1970 Declarations, and explicitly reaffirmed, on a 
different basis, in the context of particular group protection instruments.43 Richard Falk has noted that 
the international community’s insistence on preserving the territorial integrity of states has not 
prevented sovereignty readjustments in responding to new empirical realities, as exemplified by the 
recognition of new states within Yugoslavia’s former constituent republics’ boundaries or partial 
recognition of Kosovo’s unilateral independence.44 Whatever we make of the legal strength of 
territorial integrity in the face of developments on the ground, one cannot deny the consistently 
inhibiting factor the principle has had on the international endorsement of secessionist movements. So 
much so that the independence of the colonies was not treated as ‘secession’ from the metropolitan 
state, and consistently with the no-secession rule, the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia was 
treated as no more than ‘dissolution’, while various so-called ‘frozen’ conflicts in Eastern Europe 
have continued to attract (at least nominal) support for territorial unity.45 Importantly, there is an 
internal aspect to the territorial integrity principle that is probably more significant than the formal 
capacity of the principle to contain ‘state-shattering’ practices. One may argue that territorial integrity 
no longer defines solely the outer limits of sovereign power, but rather delineates a physical and legal 
space within which sovereignty must be ‘earned’ through constant engagement with individual and 
collective constituencies.46 Well-known arguments about ‘remedial secession’ in response to a chronic 
failure by a group to exercise internal self-determination, as tentatively articulated in recent judicial 
pronouncements – are not so much a (re-)statement of the contingent nature of the territorial integrity 
                                                          
39 A. Cassese, supra note 6, p. 131. 
40 For discussion, see also P. Macklem, The Sovereignty of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), ch. 7. 
41 See e.g. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, UN GA Res. 47/135 (1992), Article 2(2)-(4); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
UN Doc A/61/L.67 (2007), Articles 3, 4, 18, and 19; Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 1 
February 1995 CETS No. 157, Article 15; see generally G. Pentassuglia, supra note 3, pp. 271-280; M. Weller (ed.), 
Political Participation of Minorities: A Commentary on International Standards and Practice (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010). 
42 See e.g. P. Macklem, supra note 40; C. Bell, supra note 10. 
43 See e.g. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, supra note 41, Article 8(4); United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Ibid., Article 46(1);  
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Ibid., Article 21. 
44 R. Falk, supra note 11, pp. 114-116. 
45 For discussion, see M. Craven, supra note 19; J. Ringelheim, “Considerations on the International Reaction to the 1999 
Kosovo Crisis”, 2 Revue Belge de Droit International (1999), p. 475; C. Bell, supra note 10, pp. 226-227. 
46 See e.g. P.R. Williams and F. Jannotti Pecci, “Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination”, 40 Stanford Journal of International Law (2004), p. 1; H. Hannum, supra note 15. 
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of states as a reminder of the role of self-determination as a basis for both validating and challenging 
the configuration of domestic legal orders.47 
 In short, for all its imperfections and selectivity, the law of self-determination cannot be reduced 
to a quest for ‘nation-statehood’, or indeed for strictly homogenous societies in the face of 
overwhelming diversity within and across state boundaries. While the centrality of the state as an 
institutional entity remains intact, the theoretical and practical workings of that law have increasingly 
exposed the failures of the nation-state’s homogenising purposes. The fundamental question is, in 
fact, not one of independence of ‘nations’ but rather the ability of self-determination to yield 
recalibrations of authority as a result of agreed processes and legitimate group demands.      
 
3.3  A Unilateral Act? 
Another familiar trope in ‘national’ self-determination discourse is the notion that what is at stake is 
fundamentally a unilateral right, a right that inheres in the claimant whose decision-making operates 
as something of a trump card over others’ interests, or more accurately, as a right capable of 
overriding others’ consent within the wider political community. For example, several of the ethnic 
conflicts in Eastern Europe and elsewhere have been fuelled by unilateral moves by sub-national 
groups in the form of national independence referenda or declarations of independence outside of an 
agreed process with the central government.  
 From an international law standpoint, there is very little evidence, however, that this sort of 
approach has ever been deemed (a priori) acceptable, or indeed that self-determination is being 
reconfigured as a right of irredentist groups such as the ethnic Russians in Crimea to join a state to 
which they are historically linked.48 Comparatively speaking, the process of decolonisation was fairly 
unique in that it enabled colonial territories to achieve independence through actual (or presumed) 
acts of unilateral decision-making, despite attempts by the colonial powers to somehow undermine the 
notion of colonial self-determination as a legally protected entitlement to break away from empires 
regardless of the latter’s consent or negotiating good-will.49 But if this paradigm was meant to remedy 
the emerging ‘abnormality’ of colonialism on the basis of a political and legal rupture between the 
status of those territories and the territories of the states administering them, one cannot assume that 
the same paradigm applies within established states. In fact, most of the aforementioned unilateral 
proclamations (via a local referendum or the act of some local representative body) have been rejected 
by the international community as providing a potentially useful but clearly insufficient basis for 
statehood. In the Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence,50 the ICJ strictly 
distinguished such a declaration from the exercise of a pre-existing right to independence, or indeed 
secession, under international law. It is one thing, the Court argued, to unilaterally declare an entity to 
be a state, and it is quite another to treat the declaration (or by analogy, a referendum result in favour 
of independence) as the reflection of the exercise of a right conferred on the entity to separate itself 
from the state where it is located under international law.     
 The ICJ’s reluctance to address underlying issues of self-determination and secession in the 
Kosovo case goes quite a long way towards explaining its seemingly formalistic approach to the 
question posed to it by the General Assembly. In fact, declarations of independence or independence 
referenda are typical attempts to assert a right to self-determination by those groups who feel entitled 
to it. Arguing as the ICJ did, that unilateral proclamations of statehood are not in violation of 
international law unless incompatible with norms of ius cogens does little to explain, let alone 
acknowledge, that correlation. And yet, the overly prudent position of the ICJ can hardly be taken to 
imply the underwriting of unilateral independentism as the basis for determining the claimant’s 
                                                          
47 Reference Re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (hereinafter: the Reference case). ‘External’ self-determination in 
the form of ‘remedial secession’ would be contingent upon the state failing to respect ‘internal’ self-determination. Ibid., 
paras. 134-135. For a similar thesis, see D. Raič, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer Law International, 
Dordrecht, 2002), ch. 7. 
48 But see Y. Shany, “Does International Law Grant the People of Crimea and Donetsk a Right to Secede?” 21 Brown 
Journal of World Affairs (2014), p. 233. 
49 J. Summers, “The internal and external aspects of self-determination reconsidered”, in D. French (ed.), Statehood and Self-
Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015), 
pp. 245-246. 
50 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory 
Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403. 
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position vis-à-vis the state, especially when considered against the historical backdrop of internal 
referenda or plebiscites (or less frequently, declarations of independence) that received a modicum of 
international supervision as well as the undisputed unilateral right of the colonies to independence.51 
Needless to say, circumstances on the ground may be such that the handling of such claims may 
translate into a more nuanced practice. As the collapse of Yugoslavia seems to show, there might be 
situations where the cumulative impact of unilateral acts of independence can lead to a de facto 
reshaping of acceptable self-determination units out of the ashes of a federal state,52 while Kosovo’s 
ostensibly self-conferral of statehood in spite of Serbian assertions of sovereignty can still be 
recognised by states, though not necessarily all of them.53 There might even be cases that are widely 
regarded of a quasi-colonial nature, as the case of Palestinian occupied territories, where 
implementation of unilateral rights may be difficult to achieve.54 Conversely, proponents of ‘remedial’ 
secession argue precisely on the basis of a unilateral right to independent statehood as a remedy 
against gross human rights violations suffered by the group who is seeking it. Multiple variables of 
course affect legal analyses, be they the systematic failure of entire states as opposed to discrete 
segments of them, an irreversible deadlock in negotiations or an amply documented record of severe 
human rights abuses by the central authorities. Yet, none of them suggests that unilateral 
independentism is, in and of itself, acceptable, let alone desirable, save in fairly specific 
circumstances.  
 Whatever explanatory nuances we attach to particular cases or whatever one’s view of the 
capacity of remedial secession to stand on its own feet as a separate legal entitlement, there is a strong 
case to be made for the postcolonial extension of self-determination as a quintessentially relational 
exercise construed around a right to negotiate. In this sense, the significance of the 1998 Reference 
case before the Supreme Court of Canada does not turn on a failure to identify a unilateral right of 
Quebec to secede from Canada under both constitutional law and international law, but rather on the 
constructive legal framework that the Court delineated in order to articulate a ‘meaningful’ exercise of 
internal self-determination to the benefit of all the parties concerned, including groups and individuals 
within and outside the province. Indeed, the Court’s insistence on the interplay of federalism, 
democracy, the rule of law and the protection of minorities as a basis for addressing Quebecois’ 
claims, while distinctive to the Canadian constitutional and political set-up, simultaneously spoke to a 
wider international practice concerned with rights of participation in the decision-making process 
across a range of affected groups and geared towards delivering general or special access to 
government and representation, various forms of cultural recognition, and/or the constitutional 
redefinition of the state itself.55 In retrospect, it is not unreasonable to read some of the Eastern 
European developments as attempts to deliver or support hybrid solutions across the relevant 
spectrum of inter-group diversity, linking the recognition of national identities to participation and 
power-sharing arrangements, including (partly) cross-border ties. For example, the Badinter 
Commission’s opinions delivered in light of the 1991 EC’s Guidelines on Recognition and an EC-
sponsored draft convention on “human rights and rights of national and ethnic groups”, as well as the 
‘Ahtisaari Plan’ for Kosovo in 2007, they both sought to combine minimum standards of participation 
and representation in government with complex forms of inter-group accommodation.56 While the 
                                                          
51 This was reaffirmed in Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, para. 132 (distinguishing the colonial 
entitlement from a secessionist claim within a state context). For the limited role of plebiscites in post-war Versailles, see N. 
Berman, supra note 9, pp. 1859-1860. 
52 See generally European Community Declaration on Yugoslavia and the Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition 
of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, 16 December 1991, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), p. 
1485. 
53 As of December 2016, over 100 states had recognised Kosovo’s independence.  
54 For discussion over the type of obligations involved in relation to Palestinian self-determination, see e.g. Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 
p. 131, Separate Opinions of Judge Higgins, Judge Kooijmans, and Judge Elarby. 
55 G. Pentassuglia, supra note 3, pp. 271-280; Id., Minority Groups and Judicial Discourse in International Law: A 
Comparative Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2009), pp. 106-121 (especially pp. 117-121). 
56 See supra note 52; Report of the Secretary General on the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, 31 
International Legal Materials (1992), p. 1549; for commentary over the-then EC policy, see also D. Orentlicher, supra note 
10, pp. 65-68. As for Kosovo developments, see The Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement (‘Ahtisaari 
Plan’), UN Doc. S/2007/168 (2007); http://www.kuvendikosoves.org/common/docs/Comprehensive%20Proposal%20.pdf;  
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EC’s commitment to this process failed the test of practical consistency rather than principled 
coherence,57 Kosovo’s ex post recognition of independence by several states was still conditioned on 
the existence of inter-group mechanisms of power-sharing and some form of international 
supervision.58 Here again, the question was not one of legally underwriting a unilateral march of self-
contained ‘nations’ into sovereign independence, but rather one of capturing conditions under which 
various group claims could be considered for some rearrangement of authority within emerging states.  
     
3.4  Vindicating ‘Peoplehood’? 
Probably the most significant area of uncertainty and confusion surrounding popular claims to 
‘national’ self-determination is the association of the claimant with a ‘people’ (or indeed, a ‘nation’), 
particularly in the sense of a fairly coherent cultural community linked to a traditional homeland. 
Contemporary (postcolonial) self-determination claimants have typically sought to ground their 
claims in their status as a ‘people’ under international law. In other words, they have sought to convert 
what they perceive as a very distinctive socio-political reality into a legal claim based on the category 
used by international law to identify the beneficiary of the right to self-determination. 
 In terms of legal terminology post-1945, the progressive shift from ‘nation’ to ‘people’ marked 
the beginning of a process aimed to vest self-determination with a reconfigured status and meaning. In 
practice, the occasional pairing of these two terms in early UN articulations of the concept, including 
Article 1(2) of the UN Charter, the 1952 General Assembly Resolution 637(A) on “The Rights of 
Peoples and Nations to Self-Determination”59 or the 1960 Declaration, reflected a deliberate 
narrowing of self-determination to either the recognition of the right of states to be free from outside 
interference or the right of dependent peoples to achieve political and legal independence within 
acceptable bounds. Crucially, colonial self-determination did not operate on the basis of a pre-defined 
cultural community, nor was there already in place a sufficiently strong civic nation on which the 
would-be states could thrive. As Diane Orentlicher has aptly noted, the forging of national identities 
in postcolonial African states effectively started by the time the colonies broke with their empires, 
which also meant that such a goal had to be achieved in a remarkably short period of time. The 
weakness of their civic and institutional structures was more of a dark legacy of colonialism than the 
emergence of multi-ethnic societies per se.60  
 Be that as it may be, colonial self-determination was to a large extent a one-off affair. The need 
for the claimant to qualify as a territorially-configured colonial people in order to benefit from the 
right added contingency to it. It was not way of recognising a right that inhered in ‘all peoples’ 
defined in the abstract, but rather a way of prioritising certain communities (territorially defined) over 
other communities (however defined).61 If postcolonial states provided one of the starkest examples of 
a state-to-nation trajectory, the simultaneous reformulation of self-determination as a human right 
(indeed an essential requirement for all human rights), first articulated in the aforementioned General 
Assembly Resolution 637(A), nonetheless laid the foundations for what over a decade later would 
appear to be a broader articulation of the right in common Article 1 of the UN Covenants on Human 
Rights (“all peoples have the right to self-determination”), at least within the institutional 
(constitutional and political) framework of the state.62  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
M. Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999: International Documents and Analysis, 1 (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999). 
57 As is known, some of the Badinter Commission’s findings were not consistently followed through by the European 
Community as the recognition of the new entities, particularly Croatia and Bosnia, became politically expedited in 1992.  
58 See details at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7249034.stm. 
59 UN Doc. A/RES/637 (VII), 16 December 1952. 
60 See D. Orentlicher, supra note 10, pp. 17-18.    
61 Importantly, the divide between European states and League mandate territories, or between post-UN overseas colonies 
and other (still unchallenged) dominated territories, though based on political priorities and/or the broad cultural assumptions 
underpinning the ‘civilised/uncivilized’ paradigm, still did not reflect a ‘cherry-picking’ act from a pre-set variety of entities 
claiming to represent ‘ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ nations. See supra Section 3.1. For interesting commentary, see also A. Anghie, 
“Nationalism, Development and the Postcolonial State: The Legacies of the League of Nations”, 41 Texas International Law 
Journal (2006) p. 447 (noting that, if anything, the new ‘culture’ of the postcolonial state was to transcend local cultures 
altogether). 
62 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-determination), 13 March 1984, at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883f822.html, para. 4. 
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 While these developments have been the subject of a sustained scholarly debate over the years, it 
is relatively less clear how international law (and the international community) should respond to 
‘national’ groups’ claims to self-determination that are seemingly in conflict with this (largely 
territorial) paradigm. The problem is unlikely to be resolved through precise definitions or judicial or 
quasi-judicial pronouncements over the status of a claimant as a ‘people’ or a ‘nation’ within an 
emerging or established state. For example, the EC Badinter Commission located the position of the 
Bosnian Serbs around hybrid notions of ‘population’, ‘minority’ and ‘ethnic group’ for purposes of 
self-determination within Bosnia.63 The ICJ, for its part, held that Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence was not, in and of itself, at odds with international law, but still refrained from 
recognising the population of Kosovo, let alone the Kovosar Albanians, as a people in a legal sense.64 
Critics have suggested that the awkwardness surrounding these rulings reflect a failure to recognise 
sub-unit claims from within the internal federal boundaries of collapsing Yugoslavia or a failure to 
genuinely engage with self-determination issues from within Serbia as an established state.65 Yet, it 
can be argued that these pronouncements underscore a deeper tension between the law of self-
determination and claims to self-determination made by ‘national’ groups, one that can be resolved 
neither through carving out entire states out of a ‘national’ droit acquis in ‘abnormal’ circumstances 
of territorial and political transition66, nor through outright rejection of such claims or some 
alternative version of them.67   
 These ambiguities can be further illustrated by the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the 
status of Quebec in the Reference case. The gist of the Court’s general line of reasoning is that, 
because the right to self-determination is a human right, it cannot be a right of states, let alone nation-
states. Being as it is a right that accrues to a ‘people’ as opposed to a state, it “may include a portion 
of the population of an existing state”. Arguing otherwise, the Court says, would make the right to 
self-determination “largely duplicative” and “would frustrate its remedial purpose”.68 There seems to 
be every reason to be skeptical about the actual bearing of these comments. For one thing, it can be 
questioned whether remedial secession (even assuming the existence of a positive norm to that effect) 
requires the existence of a victimised ‘people’ as opposed to a minority or an institutional entity 
comprising several groups.69 More broadly, the distinction between rights of states and rights of 
individuals and groups (of which the right to self-determination is one) does not, in and of itself, tell 
us anything specific about the depth or contours of ‘peoplehood’. It is one thing to argue that rights of 
groups are not rights of states or governments, and it is quite another to derive from this any firm 
conclusions about the extent to which the term ‘people’ can reach out to particular groups, such as 
distinct ‘nations’ or sub-national communities, as a matter of human rights law or indeed international 
law. All human rights – both individual and collective – accrue to entities other than the state within 
which they are enjoyed. In other words, all individuals and groups hold (or may hold) human rights 
because they are not states. While this disjunction – or non-state marker – lies at the very heart of 
international human rights law, it cannot be determinative of the personal scope of the right to self-
determination other than by contrasting this right with rights of states. This does not mean that self-
determination may not benefit “a portion of the population of an existing state”. It only means that the 
self-determination/human rights nexus as defined by the Court is not conclusive as to who is entitled 
to claim particular forms of self-determination from within the state.    
                                                          
63 European Community Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, supra note 25, p. 1497. 
64 See supra note 50, paras. 51, 56, 82, 89, 105, 109. 
65 See e.g. R. Falk, supra note 11, pp. 115-116 (commenting on H. Hannum’s “Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: 
Old Wine in New Bottles?”, 3 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems (1993), p. 59). 
66 Just as in the Aaland Islands case the international community’s intervention to address the claims in transitional 
circumstances did not use the ‘nation’ as the ultimate controlling legal principle, so the EC’s heightened competence in 
Yugoslavia did not buttress the equation between ‘natural’ (national) communities and nation-states. 
67 However arguably clumsily, the Badinter Commission’s Opinion No. 2 (supra note 25) still sought to reconcile 
sovereignty, self-determination and human rights by looking at minority protection and possible dislocations of power across 
national boundaries.  
68 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, para. 124. 
69 This is even more so if the unit in question includes individuals or groups who do not wish to secede or if that unit is 
subsumed into the colonial category of ‘non-self-governing territory’: on the latter case, see T. Frank, “Post-modern 
tribalism and the right to secession”, in C. Brölmann, R. Lefeber and  M. Zieck (eds.), Peoples and Minorities in 
International Law (Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht, 1993) p. 3, at pp. 13-14. In any event, the Court questioned 
whether remedial secession could be considered an established international law standard (supra note 47). 
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 What is remarkable about the Court’s approach is that, what would intuitively appear to be a 
sympathetic view of Quebec as a people for purposes of self-determination does not translate into an 
actual acknowledgement of it. Quite the reverse, the Court noted in no uncertain terms that 
determining the exact status of the French-speaking community of Quebec or indeed of other groups 
within Quebec as a ‘people’ was not necessary in the case at hand. Given that much of the judgment 
locates Quebec’s position in the context of a wider process of internal self-determination and even the 
possibility of Quebec’s secession,70 such an agnostic line says more about the ambiguities of the 
‘peoplehood’ (or ‘nationhood’) argument than it says about the substance of self-determination. In a 
language that essentially drew upon the 1970 UN Friendly Relations Declaration, the Court did not 
prioritise group status issues but focussed instead on the “whole of the people or peoples resident 
within the territory” as a basis for proper constitutional (internal) arrangements. What does come into 
view is thus an explicit, yet hybrid, acknowledgment of the coexistence of various ‘national’ groups 
within the state and the requirement of complex constitutional conversations designed to achieve 
accommodation of that diversity, regardless of precise classifications or characterisations. To put it 
differently: Recognising Quebec’s Francophone population as a ‘people’ for purposes of international 
law (or even a ‘people’ amongst other ‘peoples’ within Quebec) would not have added anything 
specific or substantive to the general argument about inter-group diversity within the state as the legal 
and political arena for such an accommodation.  
 While these decisions may struggle to fit rigid patterns of doctrinal coherence or to fully match 
expectations on the ground, they still seem to be able to make space for a constructive, though 
tentative, response of international law to ‘national’ demands (or some of them), in ways that 
arguments built around ‘peoplehood’ (or ‘nationhood’) per se cannot. This is not to suggest that sub-
national groups seeking a measure of self-determination cannot be viewed as ‘peoples’ under 
international law. For example, the treatment of some such groups has gradually come within the 
purview of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and indigenous groups have been 
recognised as ‘peoples’ entitled to self-determination under the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. However, as I have discussed elsewhere,71 neither of these cases 
reflects a strict terminological coherence or a quest for group status precision, either within the 
context of the same treaty or across the field in question. Crucial components of indigenous rights 
come from legal settings where matters of group status are either irrelevant or have been deliberately 
omitted,72 and practice under the African Charter suggests, if anything, the hybrid capacity of this 
instrument to protect a variety of minority groups, regardless of how to translate their communal 
pedigree into legal discourse.73 There does not seem to be a general requirement for ethno-cultural 
groups seeking a measure of autonomy within the state to qualify as a people, nor have national 
legislators, international adjudicators or policy-makers been keen to make this sort of 
determinations.74  
                                                          
70 True, the Court ruled out remedial secession on human rights grounds in the case at hand, but it was unclear how that 
fitted into the Court’s prior silence as to who was entitled to remedial secession in the first place, and whether Quebec would 
have been entitled to remedial secession as a distinct ‘people’ or some other entity, had denial of access to government and 
gross human rights abuses been proven.  
71 G. Pentassuglia, “Do Human Rights Have Anything to Say about Group Autonomy?”, in G. Pentassuglia (ed.), Ethno-
Cultural Diversity and Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, forthcoming, 2018).  
72 See e.g. International Labour Organisation Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, 
Article 1(3); for an assessment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ approach to indigenous land rights, see G. 
Pentassuglia, “Toward a Jurisprudential Articulation of Indigenous Land Rights”, 22 European Journal of International Law 
(2011), p. 165. 
73 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Comm. No. 75/92 (1995); Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and 
Minority Rights Group International on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council v. Kenya, Comm. No. 276/2003 (2009); Kevin 
Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 266/2003 (2009); The Social and Economic Rights Action Center for 
Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001); Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, 
Comm. Nos. 54/91, 61/91, 98/93/, 164/97 à 196/97 and 210/98 (2000), para. 131. For discussion, see e.g. S.A. Dersson, “The 
jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights with respect to peoples’ rights”, 6 African Human 
Rights Law Journal (2006), p. 358. 
74 Indeed, the reluctance by international bodies to engage in such classifications matches a similar reluctance in domestic 
settings: see e.g. M. Suksi, “On the Entrenchment of Autonomy”, in M. Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: Applications and 
Implications (Kluwer Law International, Dordrecht, 1998), p. 151, at p. 165 (noting that very few groups enjoying autonomy 
through domestic arrangements have been recognised as ‘peoples’ for such purposes). 
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 The key point is that, while it is possible for specific international instruments to recognise 
certain groups as peoples, including groups who view themselves as ‘nations’, in connection with 
self-determination issues arising within their own contexts, this is far from necessary in any particular 
instance and cannot have wider implications as a matter of international law. More significantly, such 
cases, along with the other cases mentioned earlier, should be taken to represent particular 
participation-based articulations of underlying (general) issues of group protection and inter-group 
diversity within plural societies rather than the effect of logical or normative necessity regarding sub-
state ‘peoplehood’, let alone the working of any legal consistency on this matter across the whole of 
the international legal system.  
 
4  ‘National’ Claims and the Instabilities of International Law Discourse 
 
If the legal oddity generated by some familiar themes surrounding the ‘national’ self-determination 
claim, as discussed in Section 3, exposes the tensions and selectivity of the law of self-determination, 
that same uncertainty can also feed into broader perspectives that lead to questioning the very validity 
of ‘national’ claims of a broad ethno-cultural variety, the ability of international law to relate to 
complex socio-political realities on the ground, or the permissibility or desirability to respond to those 
claims in distinctive ways. They arguably account for much of the ambivalence of international law 
towards asserted group identities. 
 Some commentators, for instance, have argued that, since there is no natural standard to assess 
the existence of ‘national’ communities, ‘national’ self-determination claims should be understood 
essentially as ways “to enlist popular support for the struggle against political oppression”, be they in 
the form of anti-colonialism as we have known it, or some other form of resistance or reaction to 
imperial or post-imperial domination around the world.75 Even more strongly, others have gone as far 
as to question the plausibility of coherent cultural, national, or identity claims as significant drivers of 
human identity in an era of globalisation and mobility.76 For them, if there is any culture or identity at 
all, it is a global one that dissolves, not affirms, differences. However, while it may be historically 
accurate to link several ‘national’ claims to emancipatory projects, or other ostensibly similar claims 
to political manipulation or aggressive chauvinism and imperialism, or to capture fluidity in cultures 
seemingly underpinning such claims, it would be wrong to assume either that claims made by sub-
national groups can be reduced to purely political discourse or that all ‘national’ demands, because of 
political priorities, involve considerable restructuring of the state as opposed to more limited forms of 
equality and recognition. For one thing, social science research has convincingly shown that, 
whatever their origins and form, and whatever their openness and potential for negotiation and 
revision, group identities including ‘national’ sentiments must be taken seriously as they are no less 
real underlying social determinants than the political projects or priorities that help mediate them (or 
some of them).77 At the same time, ‘national’ claims feed into a legal and political narrative that is 
distinctive to the creation and functioning of the modern state. Virtually no states are home to 
homogenous socio-cultural ‘nations’, yet most states seek to secure one version or another of a 
uniform public culture, of a uniform cultural paradigm, that poses a threat (in principle or in practice) 
to group diversity. Conversely, as I discussed in section 2, the very emergence of new states in the 
name of ‘national’ independence, or the continuing running of states as nation-states – from Europe, 
to the Americas, to Africa and Asia – have consistently raised questions about the rearrangement of 
authority within the newly constituted or established entity in order to meet certain group demands.78   
 While there is a wide consensus on the notion that self-determination operates below the surface 
of the state as it encapsulates a right of peoples, not states or governments per se, there is a sense that 
                                                          
75 M. Koskenniemi, supra note 11, p. 262. 
76 For discussion and critique of this line, see e.g. J. Tully, supra note 8, pp. 45-47. 
77 See e.g. the insightful analyses of I. Berlin, “Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power”, in H. Hardy (ed.), Against The 
Current: Essays in the History of Ideas (The Hogarth Press, London, 1979), p. 333; C. Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 
(Fontana Press, London, 1973); Id., Mondo globale, mondi locali: cultura e politica alla fine del ventesimo secolo (il 
Mulino, Bologna, 1995), chps. II and IV; J. Tully, supra note 8. 
78 For a review of similar debates in South East Asia, see e.g. J. Castellino, “Autonomy in South Asia: Evidence for the 
Emergence of a Regional Custom”, in T. Malloy and F. Palermo (eds.), Minority Accommodation through Territorial and 
Non-Territorial Autonomy (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015), p. 217. 
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international law leaves space for conceptual ambiguity vis-à-vis the paths on which it needs to be set 
for this sort of (sub-state) group claims to be taken seriously. This can be best illustrated by analyses 
of group claims to secession or autonomy arrangements, on the one hand, and to democratic 
participation in governance, on the other.  
 At one end of the scale is what I might call the ‘effectiveness’ approach to self-determination. It 
is essentially based on the notion that, because international law does not or cannot regulate matters 
such as unilateral secession or autonomy regimes within a state, the law of self-determination is 
inevitably hostage to facts on the ground.  Fernando Tesón, for example, has argued that the principle 
of self-determination and the principle of territorial integrity prevail over one another depending on 
whether or not a secessionist movement is successful in overcoming resistance from the territorial 
state and the international community. On this model, the annexation of Crimea by Russia or the 
independence of Kosovo would be legally a matter of self-determination (vel non) depending on 
whether or not Ukraine, Serbia and/or the rest of the world are factually capable of reversing it.79 
Tesón’s view seems questionably to imply some measure of retrospective legal recognition of self-
determination claims and arguably downplays international law’s a priori resistance to validating facts 
that are deemed incompatible with peremptory rules of general international law.80 But what is 
important for this discussion is the logic of fait accompli – ‘secession in the streets’, to borrow from 
the Reference case81 – on which this approach rests. Although the principle of ‘effectiveness’ is not 
necessarily a trump card for securing statehood under these circumstances, international law’s clearly 
hostile, yet deregulatory, approach to unilateral secession can be overtaken by new political and 
military realities on the ground, and can possibly become entrenched by some degree of international 
recognition.82 In a broadly similar fashion, international support for groups seeking autonomy 
arrangements (short of independence) within a state has been exceptionally vocal in response to new 
‘facts’ on the ground – the reality of territorial control and/or loss of life often coupled with the 
abolition of previous forms of self-government – and, conversely, more cautious and tentative (though 
not necessarily hostile) where these circumstances have not (or have never) been met.83 The 
consequent asymmetry or ad hocism in fostering autonomy solutions as part of self-determination 
inter-group arrangements can thus be regarded as a reflection of realpolitik, not international human 
rights law as such. The priority of facts over law would only be tempered by the international 
recognition of autonomy regimes that already exist within states’ more stable societies.84     
 At the other end of the scale is a minimalist concept of participation in governance within states. 
As I noted earlier, international law’s gradual shift away from colonial self-determination towards the 
notion of internal self-determination based on ‘representative government’, as first articulated in the 
1970 Declaration and further expounded by a closer link with the substance of human rights standards 
and the requirements of participation in public decision-making (e.g. under Article 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), has suggested an alternative avenue for 
addressing sub-state group claims. Nevertheless, calls for equating internal self-determination with a 
distinct ‘right to democracy’ under international law – the right of a people to engage in meaningful 
decision-making within the state – have remained ambiguous given their somehow elusive empirical 
foundations and more crucially, the different ways in which the requirement of democracy can be 
articulated. Proponents of narrow electoral views of democracy have emphasised general collective 
aspects of voting rights and internationally-backed processes of election monitoring rather than any 
additional requirement of re-arranging decision-making authority for the benefit of particular 
                                                          
79 F. Tesón, “Introduction: The Conundrum of Self-Determination”, in F. Tesón (ed.), The Theory of Self-Determination 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016), pp. 7-8. 
80 See e.g. J. Vidmar, “Crimea’s Referendum and Secession: Why it Resembles Northern Cyprus More than Kosovo”, at 
www.ejiltalk.org/crimeas-referendum-and-secession-why-it-resembles-northern-cyprus-more-than-kosovo. 
81 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, para. 142. 
82 T. Christakis, “The State as a ‘primary fact’: some thoughts on the principle of effectiveness”, in M. Kohen (ed.), 
Secession: International Law Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), p. 138. As a matter of positive 
international law, this approach is thus independent of whether remedial secession is a viable legal entitlement.   
83 See e.g. the review of practice by J. Ringelheim, supra note 45. 
84 The Framework Convention Advisory Committee has commended autonomy arrangements “in States parties where they 
exist” (Commentary on The Effective Participation of Persons Belonging to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and 
Economic Life and in Public Affairs, 27 February 2008,  paras. 133-137). 
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groups.85 For example, in a similar vein, the so-called Pellet Report – a study on the legal impact of 
Quebec’s possible secession from Canada prepared in 1992 by five international lawyers in response 
to a request from the Committee of the Quebec National Assembly – considered indigenous 
opposition to Quebec’s independence from within the province by restating a generic right of 
indigenous groups to participate in democratic governance and assert their own identity rather than 
advancing any entitlement to a robust engagement with Quebec’s authorities on equal terms.86 And 
yet, insofar as minority groups endemically manifest themselves as political minorities and come 
under pressure to conform to dominant cultural norms, a ‘right to democracy’ understood as a mere 
entitlement to inclusion in the political community on a non-discriminatory basis does little to engage 
with such groups’ claims, including claims to specific involvement in decision-making and/or 
political autonomy.87 In short, placing the normative spotlight on democratic regimes has typically 
generated controversy over the content and boundaries of such regimes – from minimalist universal 
requirements of non-discrimination and electoral rights to ambitious and contextual projects of 
constitutional restructuring. To the extent that a focus on democratic governance aligns with 
traditional individualist accounts of human rights, it also generates tensions with efforts to vest rights 
in particular minority communities.88 Moreover, a focus on the content of domestic group 
arrangements within a human rights-based framework, though of considerable practical significance, 
has often overshadowed central questions relating to the nature of the political community within 
which group claims, including autonomy claims, are made.  
 If the foregoing account is correct, then these conceptual instabilities do not merely mirror the 
uncertainties of the positive law of self-determination vis-à-vis ‘national’ demands. Rather, they raise 
the broader question of whether there is a way for international law to capture the legitimacy of group 
claims, including those made by sub-state groups who view themselves as separate ‘nations’ or 
somehow distinct communities. Can one make sense of the self-determination/human rights/nation-
state entanglement in ways that are not reduced to accepting or rejecting seemingly ‘absolute’ claims 
to self-determination or solely enabling legal-institutional ad hocism? Is there a way for human rights 
discourse to address group-related pathologies that are (directly or indirectly) of international law’s 
own making?  
 
5  A Shift to Process: In Search of Criteria for the Internal Configuration of States 
 
As sub-state group demands test the outer limits of the right to self-determination, both externally and 
internally, there is a sense that international law requires something of a mechanism, a process or a 
framework for it to be able to meaningfully assess those demands, ideally under conditions of  
international supervision or otherwise external scrutiny.89 In other words, there is a sense that any 
ramifications of self-determination beyond decolonisation can hardly operate on their own or be left 
to the vagaries of factual realities.  
                                                          
85 See e.g. T. Frank, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, 86 American Journal of International Law (1992), p. 
46; G. Fox, “The Right to Political Participation in International Law”, 17 Yale Journal of International Law (1992), p. 539; 
G. Fox and B. Roth (eds.), Democratic Governance and International Law (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
But see also United Nations Millennium Declaration, GA Res. 55/2, UN Doc. A/55/L.2 (2000), Section V, paras. 24-25.  
86 “Territorial integrity of Quebec in the event of the attainment of sovereignty”, at 
https://english.republiquelibre.org/Territorial_integrity_of_Quebec_in_the_event_of_the_attainment_of_sovereignty#lien_1
21, para. 3.08. 
87 For a thoughtful account, see e.g. S. Marks and A. Clapham, International Human Rights Lexicon (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2005), pp. 61-70. From a different angle, see also D. Orentlicher, supra note 10, pp. 44-78 (cautioning that a 
rapid move to free elections or referenda, and nothing else, might paradoxically support certain ethno-separatist claims 
and/or entrench ethnic divisions where a strong civic culture is still in the making; a similar point is made by B. Kingsbury, 
“Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law”, 
34 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2001), p. 232).  
88 The point can also be made from a moral or political perspective. A modified version of the approach to democracy, 
including the ‘equalising effect’ of autonomy regimes, is defended, for example, by A. Patten, “Self-Determination for 
National Minorities”, in F. Tesón (ed.), supra note 79, p. 120.  
89 Here I refer, depending on the case, to either the sort of heightened competence over group accommodation experienced 
by the international community in the last century, or to more robust engagements of international institutions, policy-
makers and legal scholarship with the substance and modalities of the claims. 
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 For example, a process-oriented line is starting to emerge in relation to claims to independence or 
secession. In a bid to transcend both the seemingly intractable issue of defining ‘peoplehood’ or 
‘nationhood’ vis-à-vis sub-state group claims and the crude application of the principle of 
‘effectiveness’, a view is gradually emerging that international law can still engage with such claims 
by capturing criteria on the basis of which any successful secession can be assessed for purposes of 
recognition or even retrospective legality. Antonello Tancredi, for instance, argues for a rule of law-
based approach to secession that, while acknowledging the lack of a distinct right of sub-state groups 
to that effect, still views a range of legal criteria – including the absence of military support from third 
states, majority support through local popular vote, and territorial stability tied to the principle of uti 
possidetis – as valid parameters to determine the lawfulness of a secessionist act ex post-facto.90 To 
some extent, the EC Guidelines issued during the conflict in former Yugoslavia, too, reflected an 
attempt to manage the collapse of a federal state by employing a mix of legal and diplomatic criteria, 
including requirements of human rights and group rights protection as a basis for the eventual 
recognition of the new entity.91 The Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference case heavily drew 
upon a duty to negotiate as a fundamental benchmark against which to assess the legitimacy of any 
possible de facto secession of Quebec in the eyes of the international community.92 Although that duty 
as it applied to Quebec and other constitutionally significant actors was primarily found in the 
unwritten fabric of the Canadian Constitution, it did resonate with similar duties to negotiate tied to 
the settlement of ethnic conflicts and distinctive group rights to participate in decision-making.93 
Crucially, remedial secession, whatever its status in positive international law, is being reassessed as a 
function, not of its merely factual success, but of a host of criteria – including engagement in good 
faith negotiations and the exhaustion of all realistic possibilities for internal self-determination such as 
autonomy – that are deemed sufficient to determine the legitimacy, and possibly legality, of any 
secession that may indeed occur on that basis.94 The point on remedial secession is arguably critical. It 
looks at secession as a remedy for the injustice of internal arrangements rather than ‘peoplehood’ or 
‘nationhood’ per se. To the extent that remedial secession, at least conceptually, confirms the capacity 
of self-determination to challenge domestic legal orders, not only to protect them,95 and can be 
pursued in ways that prioritise process and outcome over whether there exists a separate right to it or 
whether secession is merely effective ‘in the streets’, it is not unreasonable to take one step back and 
look at group claims, including ‘national’ demands, as part of a similarly construed internal self-
determination discourse. To put it differently: Can one identify criteria for the overall legitimacy of 
group claims as part of the internal configuration of states? What is actually at stake here? 
 Traditional views of human rights have focussed on the role of minority cultures within a 
universal code of human rights standards that values (at least in principle) cultural differences across 
the wide spectrum of human identity. They have underpinned a global system largely built around the 
rights of individuals and tailored only in part to the requirements of security and peace preservation. 
Partly troubled at the prospect of fostering Nazi-style nationalist aggression, and partly prompted by 
assimilationist inclinations, states gradually came to confine ‘nationalist’ claims to colonial self-
determination, while subsuming other (partly Versailles-style) group claims into the more generic 
internationalist dimensions of human rights law.96 What tends to remain under the radar on such 
accounts, though, is the intimate connection between the protection of groups like ‘national 
minorities’ and ‘indigenous peoples’ and the ways in which sovereignty manifests itself in 
                                                          
90 A. Tancredi, “A normative ‘due process’ in the creation of States through secession”, in M. Kohen (ed.), supra note 82, p. 
171, at pp. 189-193. One should note, however, that the weight of local electoral or popular majorities tends to become 
highly problematic in the face of vocal opposition to independence from significant groups within the entity, as the cases of 
Bosnia and Kosovo illustrate (see also supra note 87).  
91 S. Tierney, “In a State of Flux: Self-Determination and the Collapse of Yugoslavia”, 6 International Journal on Minority 
and Group Rights (1999), p. 197. 
92 Reference Re Secession of Quebec, supra note 47, para. 143. 
93 See e.g. J. Ringelheim, supra note 45, pp. 527-528; C. Bell, supra note 10, ch. 11; see also E. Ruiz Vieytez, “Minority 
Nations and Self-Determination: A Proposal for the Regulation of Sovereignty Processes”, 23 International Journal on 
Minority and Group Rights (2016), p. 402. 
94 D. Raič, supra note 5, pp. 366-367. 
95 M. Koskenniemi, supra note 11, pp. 247-249 (noting that self-determination “both supports and challenges statehood”). 
96 See e.g. N. Berman, supra note 27, pp. 53-54. 
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international law.97 The terms of this relationship can be traced back to the distribution of sovereignty 
that the international legal order entrenches and the parameters of that sovereignty’s continuing 
(internal) exercise, rather than the universal value of identity or cultural affiliations alone.98 The 
several rearrangements of sovereign authority that have been buttressed by international law 
throughout history through treaty settlements, special acquisition doctrines, acts of independence, or 
otherwise ex post-facto validations, have been constantly punctuated by efforts to mitigate the effects 
of those redistributions on groups who found themselves within wider political communities with 
which they had little or no affiliation. From the Westphalia settlement, to the Versailles and League of 
Nations settlement, to the rise of indigenous rights post-decolonisation, to more recent attempts to 
govern the demise of the USSR and Yugoslavia and other processes of state reconfiguration, the 
mitigating impact of these multi-layered regimes of group protection says more about the structure 
and operation of the international legal order of which human rights are an integral part than it says 
about the universality of cultural difference per se. It does point to a series of ‘pathologies’ or 
‘anomalies’ that arise upon several recalibrations of sovereign power and the deployment of those 
norms as a way to not only limit and correct, but also (re-)define ‘Westphalian sovereignty’.99 And to 
the extent that the ‘anomaly’ is dynamically projected into the future of the state, it enables the 
fostering of a concept of internal self-determination as a legal arena within which that type of group 
protection, in its multiple articulations and iterations, must be achieved.100  
 In this sense, the role of national and similar communities as ‘co-founding entities’ of the state 
within the meaning of the 2006 Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly’s Resolution, is not just a 
function of practical implementation or political or military realities but raises fundamental questions 
about distinctive sovereign redistributions and distinctive conditions for the just exercise of internal 
authority. The resulting complications of inter-group (majority-minority) diversity beyond the narrow 
question of statehood, as I discussed in broader terms in Section 2, explain the tension within 
traditional human rights discourse when it comes to developing specific positive obligations for the 
benefit of minority groups and/or a pro-active approach to issues that affect the constitutional 
organisation of the state.101 Pragmatism, for its part, is unable to explain possibilities of legal or 
institutional differentiation or asymmetries within the state in ways other than crude deference to 
political stability or conflict resolution, or even the intentional or unintentional forging of sovereign 
inequalities.102  
 The following briefly sketches out the basics of a process-based human rights approach to group 
claims of the sort considered in this article. There exist at least three legal (and normative) dimensions 
or layers the cumulative impact of which is arguably essential to probing the legitimacy of such 
claims as part of a wider, ‘meaningful’ (in the words of the Reference opinion) process of internal 
self-determination:103 1) group recognition and claim-making; 2) group participation and the relative 
weight of claims; and 3) the proportionality of the modalities or means of pursuing the claims. 
                                                          
97 Here I build upon a strand of scholarship that has drawn attention to this relationship. See e.g. P. Macklem, supra note 40, 
chs. 5-7; S. Krasner and D. Froats, “Minority Rights and the Westphalian Model”, in D. Lake and D. Rothchild (eds.), The 
International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1998), p. 
227;  C. Reus-Smit, Individual Rights and the Making of the International System (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2013), pp. 97-105; J. Nijman, “Minorities and Majorities”, in B. Fassbinder and A. Peters (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
the History of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), p. 100; R. Kuppe, “The Three Dimensions of the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, 11 International Community Law Review (2009), p. 103. 
98 See e.g. P. Macklem, supra note 40, p. 48. For an articulation of aspects of this tension in human rights discourse from a 
jurisprudential perspective, see G. Pentassuglia, supra note 55, pp. 248-256; Id., supra note 3, p. 280.  
99 N. Berman, supra note 9, pp. 1872-1873; J. Nijman, supra note 97; C. Bell, supra note 10, pp. 225-226.  
100 M. Koskenniemi, supra note 10, pp. 247-249 (noting that the anomalies primarily linked to the creation of states have 
been gradually contained by the “anti-statist character of self-determination” built around group protection within the 
territorial state). 
101 On some of these tensions, see e.g. G. Pentassuglia, supra note 3, pp. 291-292.  
102 See e.g. J. Nijman, supra note 97, p. 115 (noting the built-in asymmetries in legal obligations regarding minority 
protection in the Versailles settlement). In the context of complex self-determination agreements, see also C. Bell, supra note 
10, p. 235. 
103 A review of all possible dimensions of the claims, including key extra-legal (geopolitical) factors or the technicalities of 
accommodation models, is far beyond the scope of this article. On the other hand, it is worth pointing out that my emphasis 
on ‘process’ should always be understood in connection with substantive legal matters, and at least the possibility of 
substantive outcomes. 
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5.1  Group Recognition and Claim-Making 
There may well not be an international legal obligation upon states to recognise particular groups in 
their midst, but under international law states are still required to respect, protect and fulfil the rights 
of ethno-cultural minority groups as they exist within their jurisdictions.104 Two issues arise at this 
most basic level. One has to do with the group’s collective dimension of self-identification as a 
‘national’ community (national minority, minority nation, indigenous nation, people, etc.) or 
otherwise historically distinct ‘nationality’ or group identity, however defined. The other is the 
group’s ability to articulate claims in ways that are consistent with human rights standards.  
 This is not the place for rehearsing debates over the fluid contours of definitional matters, as the 
very debate over ‘peoplehood’ clearly confirms. Suffice it to say that, while international law 
inevitably gives states a measure of leeway in singling out groups for some form of special protection, 
it definitely prohibits arbitrary limitations on the possibility of group recognition and enables a group 
to self-identify within acceptable bounds – be it an indigenous community in Africa or Asia, a 
Kurdish nation or ethno-national minority in Turkey, or a national or religious group in Cyprus.105 
From this perspective, struggles for recognition are, first of all, struggles for a particular entry point 
into the legal and political process, and states must thus respect the right of such traditional sub-state 
groups to make a plausible case for distinct recognition within the state, whatever the label they use to 
describe themselves.  
 Relatedly, any meaningful engagement of the group, including ‘national’ groups, within the 
general process of self-determination must attract the capacity of articulating valid claims within the 
wider community. For its part, the European Court of Human Rights has openly acknowledged the 
link among associative freedoms (including freedom of religion), the articulation of group identities 
under conditions of political and cultural pluralism, and the autonomous existence of minority 
communities.106 Moreover, it has firmly dismissed approaches aimed to curtail such spaces of freedom 
on security or other public grounds. A stream of cases decided against Greece, Turkey and a few other 
states in the context of pro-group activities (e.g. pro-Kurdish demands for constitutional changes and 
language rights) is a case in point. In United Communist Party of Turkey and others v. Turkey, the 
Court held in no uncertain terms that: 
 
[T]here can be no justification for hindering a political group solely because it seeks to debate in public the situation of part 
of the State’s population and to take part in the nation’s political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions 
capable of satisfying everyone concerned.107  
 
From the perspective of internal self-determination, the ability of the group to articulate claims 
operates in two overlapping directions. It is suitable for enabling degrees of pluralism and 
‘representation’ (within the meaning of the 1970 Declaration) in the relationship between the 
government and the group, and it can be instrumental in pursuing new institutional or constitutional 
arrangements through democratic means. It can also work within the group itself to the extent that 
                                                          
104 See e.g. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, supra note 41, Article 1; United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Ibid., 18th and 19th 
preambular paragraphs; Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Article 27), UN 
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5, 8 April 1994, para 5.2; Sidiropoulos v. Greece, Judgment of 10 July 1998, ECHR Reports 
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sectors of it have a different understanding of the group’s identity and/or want to question the way in 
which the group characterises itself or intends to pursue its objectives.108  
 
5.2  The Weighing of Claims through Group Participation  
As I mentioned, ethno-cultural minority groups, including sub-state national communities, are entitled 
to partake in the process of internal self-determination on the basis of a variety of participation rights, 
ranging from general voting rights to rights of ‘effective’ involvement in decision-making that is 
bound to affect them. At its core, that means that their claims have to be taken seriously by actively 
seeking meaningful group engagement and/or consent as part of a continuing relationship between the 
state and the wider political community. However, a key challenge to international human rights law 
is how to measure the relative weight of the rights claims involved, particularly in the event that a 
‘national’ group demands stronger forms of protection such as political and language autonomy on a 
territorial or non-territorial basis or even some form of nationwide power-sharing. Is there a legally 
significant way to assess such claims that is relatively independent of practical modalities, selective 
preferences or military realities?  
 In complex cases – and even more so in cases of conflict – internal self-determination should be 
regarded as providing the context for rights and duties to negotiate in good faith over the nature of the 
state. From a process-oriented perspective, the central issue should be whether or not the claims are 
sufficiently strong to rebut the presumption of authority and viability of existing arrangements within 
the state. To the extent that group accommodation is primarily designed to mitigate the impact of 
certain group-related pathologies that arise from multiple (re-)allocations of sovereign power actively 
pursued or validated by international law, group participation in the self-determination process can 
only, relatedly, serve the purpose of remedying or offsetting those pathologies, that is, certain forms 
of majoritarian (cultural) domination or oppression that have emerged (or might emerge) as a result of 
those (re-)allocations. In other words, whether or not some form of injustice needs to be corrected by 
the state, rather than ethno-cultural or national identity alone, should provide a critical basis (at least 
an important concurrent basis) for assessing the legitimacy of certain claims.  
 This does not mean that all group claims or ‘national’ demands may require a rearrangement of 
sovereignty authority. In fact, in several cases the group’s demands can be met by the state by 
acknowledging in law and public policy the multinational (or multicultural) dimension of the political 
community and by respecting, protecting and fulfilling the rights of persons belonging to the group to 
their identity.109 It only means that greater forms of protection beyond typical associative freedoms 
and cultural guarantees do not automatically derive from identity claims per se and need to be tested 
as part of a credible human rights discourse. Exclusion from state-formation in its various forms 
and/or unequal access to government, systematic attempts at forced assimilation into a singularly 
defined ‘national’ identity and/or coercive measures involving state-sponsored violence, the abolition 
of previous levels of self-government, or a combination of these, they all represent some of the most 
obvious threats faced by the groups claiming some ‘thicker’ measure of ‘effective’ participation in 
decision-making on a territorial or non-territorial basis. As I hinted at in Section 2, some of these 
pathologies have been ‘cured’ (at least partially) upon the very creation or enlargement of a state. 
Others, such as the exclusion of indigenous communities from the acquisition of sovereign power or 
otherwise decision-making authority, have been retrospectively addressed by human rights law in 
various ways, including an open recognition of indigenous autonomy under the 2007 UN Declaration.  
In a significant number of other cases, the pathologies have remained unresolved.  
 What matters here is, not (or not only) whether any particular form of group accommodation 
proves acceptable in any particular case, but rather the capacity of internal self-determination to 
enable a lucid case-by-case assessment of the extent to which the group has been affected by certain 
distributions of sovereign power buttressed by an international legal order of which human rights are 
an integral part. This approach works towards distinguishing claims, including ‘national’ claims, that 
are ultimately a (rebuttable) call for an internal reconfiguration of the state and its sovereignty from 
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more basic claims to group protection that only question the outer limits of particular measures within 
a state’s jurisdiction.110  
 
5.3  Proportionality: Representation, Self-Identification, and Rights Balancing  
Assuming there exists a prima facie legitimate claim to some rearrangement of authority within the 
state, the group still needs to demonstrate that the claim can in practice be pursued within the wider 
process of self-determination through proportionate means or modalities. Here several complexities 
affect the viability of group claims to autonomy or other form of power-sharing as they involve issues 
of representation, individual self-identification, and rights balancing and protection. Each of these 
dimensions would require a separate analysis that, for reason of space, is impossible to conduct in this 
context. Only a snapshot of their cumulative legal significance will be offered here. 
 The law of self-determination has hardly addressed the question of how representative a claimant 
should be in order to validly sustain the claim. For example, the representativeness of national 
liberation movements or similar structures was either assumed due to socio-political circumstances or 
considered on a case-by-case basis by UN and regional organisations.111 Although the so-called 
‘agency problem’ is in no way unique to group claims, issues of representation have surfaced in 
relation to minority group grievances or wider issues of participation in decision-making.112 Global or 
regional human rights adjudicators have frequently deferred to the group structure’s self-perception as 
a representative body or relevant domestic patterns of interaction between the state and communal 
entities as legal persons. Nevertheless, they have also upheld a measure of pluralism internal to the 
group’s practices and an effective level of participation and inclusiveness among the various sectors 
of the group.113 What is important for our purposes is that the claim to some rearrangement of 
authority can demonstrably be seen to derive from a reasonably adequate and proportionate process of 
informed decision-making within the group, in its various ramifications, that can at least mitigate the 
risk of elite manipulation and abuse in articulating the group’s interest. Models of democratic 
accountability based on voluntary electoral procedures (including some form of local popular vote by 
analogy with external claims, as noted earlier) are normally regarded as best positioned to secure the 
legitimacy of the relevant body (or bodies) acting on behalf of the community.114 Even so, it has been 
convincingly argued that group members that choose not to register on special electoral rosters or are 
otherwise members of smaller voluntary (non-elected) organisations should equally have a stake in 
increasing the legitimacy of group structures as they engage with state authorities.115  
 An especially problematic issue in this context is the role of individual self-identification in 
relation to claims made by the group and/or assumptions about group identities made by the state. 
While such claims normally presuppose a legitimate institutional agent that is capable of making them 
(or at least individuals who can legitimately voice the shared collective interest), each putative 
member of the group is in principle free to opt out of her/his putative group membership and/or to 
challenge any group status, or lack of it, imposed upon them by the state.116 However, significant 
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challenges arise when it comes to balancing out collective and individual interests in power-sharing 
agreements, which are themselves seen as a typical outcome of self-determination arrangements in 
divided societies. In cases like Bosnia, Northern Ireland, South Tyrol/Trentino, or Cyprus, the 
arrangements have been such that individuals, including members of smaller minorities, either had to 
declare their affiliation with any of the dominant groups or accept certain legal consequences resulting 
from their free identification as belonging to a group other than the dominant one or to no particular 
group.117 One can safely argue that, under international human rights law compulsory individual 
identifications with (or membership in) the group are not permitted, be they enacted through 
legislation or other domestic practices. Less clear, though, are the terms of the balancing act between 
group-based protections and individuals who freely self-identity as ‘other’ in relation to pre-defined 
positions (e.g. certain political offices or types of employment). For example, in Sejdić and Finci v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Court of Human Rights concluded that Bosnia’s power-
sharing agreement signed at Dayton in 1995 was incompatible with Article 14 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights insofar as it excluded members of communities other than the Bosnian, 
Croat and Serbian ones (who had so freely self-identified) from certain political offices.118  
 On all theoretical and practical accounts, group accommodation arrangements invariably affect 
the position of individuals within and outside the group. Particularly in the context of self-
determination arrangements, the debate over the impact of group claims on the rights of individuals 
should be understood as a debate over dynamic conflicts between potentially competing human rights 
– conflicts, that is, that are internal, not external, to human rights practice itself. From the standpoint 
of a process-based group claim to some rearrangement of authority within the state, it is thus essential 
that the group articulates its claim in such a way that shows respect for the rights of those who may be 
considerably affected by it. This requires at least credible guarantees against excessive group-based 
restrictions that amount to wholesale rights denial, and protection against any encroachments on core 
(usually non-derogable) fundamental rights.119 Needless to say, any judgment of proportionality must 
be context-sensitive and subject to a continuing process of contestation and scrutiny. International 
human rights law has developed sophisticated techniques for probing the impact of group claims on a 
case-by-case basis, and adjudicators have more often than not upheld the arrangements subject to 
correction and revision. As I have indicated elsewhere, the assessment of complex forms of 
accommodation (proposed or in place) can draw upon a range of indicators or parameters to inform 
proportionality reviews, including the nature of the claim and decision-making involved, the nature 
and depth of potentially discriminatory effects, the type of group and practices (e.g. systemic or 
otherwise), the level of support for the arrangements, and/or broader objectives like peace 
preservation.120  
 For present purposes, the broader point is that the cumulative legitimacy of group demands, 
including ‘national’ demands, should not be limited to articulating claims and establishing their prima 
facie legitimate aims, but needs also to be followed through on the basis of concrete modalities that 
can be deemed proportionate in any particular case. As noted in Section 3.3, the ‘relational’ approach 
that is reflected in the Reference case and other incidents of practice, all seem to point to hybrid, yet 
‘meaningful’, means of combining inter-group protection with the rights of others based on inclusive 
notions of representation and participation in decision-making.     
 
6  Conclusions: Connecting the Dots 
 
In this article I have addressed selective international legal dimensions of the self-
determination/human rights/nation-state nexus as they specifically affect the substance and reach of 
claims made by ethno-cultural minority groups, particularly those of a ‘national’ variety. While the 
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complexities of group accommodation have been effectively charted within narrow historical or 
thematic contexts, traditional scholarly preoccupations with the existence (vel non) of a distinct legal 
right (e.g. to secession, autonomy, or democratic governance) that can benefit the entity in question (a 
‘people’ or some other population group) have resulted in limited attention to a deeper understanding 
of what is at stake when it comes to addressing group claims or some of them, or otherwise the 
outlining of a framework for assessing the legitimacy of such claims. With this in mind and a primary 
focus on the internal configuration of states, I have sought to explain the role of international human 
rights law in dealing with group claims that lie at the intersection of the aforementioned triangular 
nexus in a way that retains the value of group identities without falling prey to claims based on 
primordial title or pristine national authenticity, the logic of fait accompli, or otherwise minimalist 
views of the democratic entitlement and its human rights components. 
 I have argued that, whatever our preferred reading or understanding of a ‘nation’, the reality of 
states as legal entities is – almost invariably – the reality of a ‘public culture’ coalescing around a 
dominant group. As states look ‘faceless’ legal persons from an international law standpoint, the 
international legal order has typically sought to accommodate, and yet discipline, ‘national’ demands 
as an area of inter-group diversity relating to the content and shape of sovereignty – from relatively 
straightforward respect for cultural diversity to complex forms of dislocation of power. While not all 
such demands seek, or even require, significant degrees of political power or decision-making 
authority, many claimants have used the language of ‘national’ self-determination to articulate those 
demands. 
 Against this backdrop, I have critiqued some popular themes (or ‘myths’) surrounding the 
‘national’ self-determination claim: that there is a linear continuity in thinking about self-
determination as a legal entitlement; that self-determination is fundamentally about independence or 
secession; that it operates as an inherent unilateral right; and that it is defined by the universal 
aspiration of groups who characterise themselves as ‘peoples’ or ‘nations’ in a broadly cultural sense.  
 At the same time, I have also noted that the limitations and uncertainties surrounding these 
themes have fed into broader perspectives that lead to questioning the very validity of ethno-cultural 
‘national’ claims, the ability of international law to relate to complex socio-political realities on the 
ground, or the permissibility or desirability to respond to those claims in distinctive ways. Although 
these perspectives arguably account for much of the ambivalence of international law towards 
asserted group identities, I have contended that group identities including ‘national’ sentiments are no 
less real underlying social determinants than the political projects or priorities that help mediate them 
(or some of them) and, more importantly, feed into a legal and political narrative that is distinctive to 
the creation and functioning of the state.  
 I have thus argued that those conceptual instabilities do not merely mirror the uncertainties of the 
positive law of self-determination vis-à-vis ‘national’ demands but raise the broader question of 
whether there is a way for international law to capture the legitimacy of group claims, including those 
made by sub-state groups who view themselves as separate ‘nations’ or somehow distinct 
communities. More specifically, I have discussed the question of whether one can make sense of the 
self-determination/human rights/nation-state nexus in ways that are not reduced to accepting or 
rejecting seemingly ‘absolute’ claims to self-determination or solely enabling legal-institutional ad 
hocism, but can instead draw upon human rights discourse to provide a general framework for 
assessing group-related pathologies that are (directly or indirectly) of international law’s own making.  
 I have then sketched out the basics of a process-based human rights approach to group claims of 
the sort considered in this study, regardless of distinctive outcomes. As part of a wider process of 
internal self-determination (ideally under respected external scrutiny in critical cases), I have captured 
at least three international legal (and normative) dimensions or layers the cumulative impact of which 
is arguably essential to probing, in a context-sensitive manner, the legitimacy of such claims: 1) group 
recognition and claim-making; 2) group participation and the relative weight of claims; and 3) the 
proportionality of the modalities or means of pursuing the claims. None of them can pre-judge any 
particular claim, but all of them represent at least some of the central issues that need to be addressed 
in contemporary self-determination practices.  
 
